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LINSKYi QUINE, AND SUBSTITUTIVITY 
Charles Schlee 
It has been argued by Linsky that the principle of 
inter-substitutivity salva veritate of co-referential sin-
gular terms in sentences (PS) 1B "just false," that it is 
such that "no two terms obey it" ([l ] i 100). What Linsky 
has criticized is a characterization of PS provided by 
Quine in "Reference and Modality" ([il], 139). An alter-
native characterization of PS has been employed by Quine 
in Word and Object ([ill], 1^3). I will argue that Lin-
sky's criticisms, given a certain qualification, are ap-
propriate when construed as criticisms of PS as charac-
terized in [II]i but I will subsequently argue that Quine's 
characterization in [ill] both (1) entirely escapes Lin-
sky's criticisms and (2) constitutes an adequate analysis 
of PS. 
Quine's characterization of PS in [il] ist "given a 
true statement of identity, one of its two terms may be 
substituted for the other in any true statement and the 
result will be true" ([il], 139). This statement is in 
a certain respect ambiguous. Before pointing out its am-
biguity, some symbolism will be introduced for the sake 
of providing precise formulation.of PS. 
Suppose given some language L. Let L = be a language 
exactly like L except that for any expression e of L, if 
e flanked by two singular terms of L is a statement of 
identity of L. the result of replacing e with '=* 1B a 
statement of identity of L =, and the only statements of 
identity of L" are statements formed in this manner. 
Where 
denote strings of symbols of L =, 
'concat(e^,...»en)' 
will denote that string of symbols of L = which results 
from concatenating what ' ' (in that order) de-
note. Moreover, 
V > 1 %> " 
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that is, 
'U^te-^, • •», a ^ ) 1 
is a function expression which denotes what its i-th 
argument expression denotes. Finally, the predicate 
letter 'T* will mean '...is true in L~*. 
Given this symbolism, one way in which PS might be 
formulated on the basis of Quine'B characterization of it 
in [II] isi 
(u) (v) ( T(concat(u, *=',v)) — > (t x)...(t n)(s) 
(( s=concat(t 1,...,t n) & (3i) ( i&n & uj(tx t n)= 
u )) — > ( T(s) i—* T(concat(t^,... .t-^.v, t i + 1,... 
,t n))))). 
The variables are to be construed as having as values 
strings of symbols of some language L s, for which lan-
guage 'T' is to be construed as a truth predicate. In 
particular, 'u' and 'v' are to have singular terms of Ir-
as values, 's' a sentence of and 'tj* 't«' any 
strings of symbols of L=. Hence, according to this for-
mulation, for any singular terms u, v, if u and v are 
understood, then for any sentence s, if u occurs in s, 
then v may replace u in s and the resulting sentence 
will have the same truth value as s. 
In [il] Quine has remarked! 
An expression which consists of another expres-
sion between single quotes constitutes a name of 
that other expression! and it is clear that the 
occurrence of that other expression or a part of 
it, within the context of quotes, is not in gene-
ral referential...not subject to the substitutiv!tv 
principle. _ ^ 
([II], 140, my italics) 
What this quotation indicates is that Quine'8 statement 
that "given a true statement of identity* one of its two 
terms may be substituted for the other in any true state-
ment and the result will be true," is a characterization 
of the conditions under whlcfr a singular term is (to use 
Quine's phrase) subject to PS. 
PS is manifestly about substituting one singular 
terra for another co-referential singular term in senten-
ces of a certain specified classi for the requisite sub-
stitution must be made in some sentence(s) or other, and 
these "some sentence(s) or other" constitute the specified 
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class. Let S be the specified class of sentences. To 
say. as Quine does, that a singular term t is subject to 
PS in a given sentence is just to say that, where t and 
t' are co-referential singular terms, t' may be substi-
tuted for t at one or more of t*s occurrences in any mem-
ber s of S and the resulting sentence will have the same 
truth value as 8 . But " f may be substituted for t M 
means the same as "t may be replaced with t'." Moreover, 
to say that a singular term t is partially replaceable 
salva veritate in a given sentence is just to say that, 
where t and t* are co-referential singular terms, t may 
be replaced with t* at one or more of t's occurrences in 
any member s of S and the resulting sentence will have 
the same truth value as s. Therefore, to say, as Quine 
does, that a singular term t is subject to PS in a given 
sentence s is just to say that t is partially replaceable 
salva veritate in s. 
'...is partially replaceable salva veritate in...' 
is to be preferred to '...is subject to PS in...' simply 
in order to avoid equivocating on 'the principle of sub-
stitutiv! ty' , for this phrase denotes the entire formula-
tion of PS, whereas adoption of the second-mentioned pre-
dicate requires using 'the principle of substitutivity' 
also to denote a proper part of the entire formulation of 
PS, viz•. the conditions specified therein. 
Let 'R' be introduced to mean '...is partially re-
placeable Sfilva veritate in... 1. Then PS, as character-
ized by Quine in LÜJ» might be formulated as follows t 
(u) (s) ( R(u,s) «r-> ((3t 1 )...(at m ) ( B B C o n c a t d ^ , . . 
.,t m) & (3i) ( i^m & ^ ( ^ . . . . . t ^ u )) & (v) ( T 
(concat(u,' = ',v)) — > (t^...(t f i)(s') (( s'=concat 
(t l f....t n) & (3i) ( i*n & U j ( t 1 ( . ' . .,tn)=u )) — ) 
( T(s') «-» (TUoncatUj t ^ , v, t i + 1 , ..., t n)))))) 
The variables are to be construed as having the same range 
of values as for the previous formulation, with 's'* rang-
ing over sentences of L = . Hence, for any singular term 
u, for any sentence s, u is partially replaceable salva 
veritate in a if, and only if, u occurs in s and for any 
singular term v, if u and v are cö-referential, then for 
any sentence s', if u occurs in s* then v may replace u 
in s' and the resulting sentence will have the same truth 
value as s'. I will henceforth refer to this latter for-
mulation as PS-2 and to the former as PS-1. 
PS-2 is a correct formulation of PS as characterize 
by Quine in [il]. F o r Quine is therein concerned to spe-
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clfy the conditions under which a singular term Is partial-
ly replaceable salva verltate in a given sentencei Quine 
is riot therein stating that these conditions are always 
satisfied. Moreover, Quine therein acknowledges a number 
of "exceptions"—singular term-sentence pairs <t,s)> such 
that t is not partially replaceable salvä verltate in si. 
and such an admission is plainly incompatible with a sup-
position that the conditions in question are always satis-
fied. 
Linsky has presented two arguments on the basis of 
which he rejects what he takes to be Quine's formulation 
of PS in [II]. Linsky's first argument is as follows. 
The 'law', however, it seems, is just false, for 
it is possible that Smith knows that Venus is the 
morning star and yet does not know that Venus is 
the evening star, though 'The morning star is the 
evening star* is a 'true statement of identity'. 
Again, from 
(1) Ci cero is Tully 
and 
(2) 'Cicero' is spelled with six letters 
it does not follow that 
(3) 'Tully* is spelled with six letters. 
Linsky uses each of these examples to show that PS is 
"just false." Linsky goes on to argue that PS is such 
that "no two terms obey it"t 
Not only is it possible to produce counter-
examples to Leibniz's law, it can be shown that 
no two terms obey it. Let t and jj* be different 
terms and consider any true statement of the form 
(4) Jones explicitly denied that t « t*. 
Surely one cannot substitute t for i* in (4) in. 
order validly to obtain 
(5) Jones explicitly denied that t = t. 
No statement of the form (5) follows from the 
corresponding statement of the form (M, even 
though t = t be true. 
([I], 100-101) 
Any of these examples clearly does show that PS-1 is 
false. Moreover, PS-1 will be such that no two terms obey 
it, for, given PS-1, obeying PS would require that a sin-
gular term be partially replaceable salva verltate with 
any co-referential singular term in any sentencei and 
Linsky's examples are clearly examples of failure of such 
replaceability. 
From Linsky's second argument it follows that no. 
singular term is partially replaceable salva verltate in 
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a.ny, sentence, where such replaceability is analyzed as by 
PS-2. Hence, PS-2 will be such that no two terms obey it. 
But in this case PS-2 will be true, for each of its in-
stantiations will be a bi-conditional each side of which 
is false* 
It follows that Linsky's conclusion that PS is "just 
false" is appropriate only for PS-1, although Linsky's 
conclusion that PS 1B such that "no two terms obey it" is 
appropriate for both PS-1 and PS-2. It also follows that 
if 'R' is to be true of any singular term-sentence pairs, 
an alternative formulation of PS must be provided. 
This has been done by Quine in [ill] as is clear 
from the following several passagest 
The positions that we have been classifying into 
purely referential and other are positions of 
singular terms relative to sentences that con-
tain them...For positions in sentences, what it 
[PS] says is that the containing sentence keeps 
its truth value when the contained singular term 
1B supplanted by any other having the same ref-
erence . 
([Ill], 143) 
What Quine has done in [ill], which he had not done in 
[il], is to relatlvize the required replaceability to g 
specific containing sentence, 
PS, as characterized by Quine in [ill], may be for-
mulated thust 
(u) (a) ( R(u,s) f-» (at1)...(atj1) (( s=concat(t 1 P.. 
•*tn) & (3i) ( i^n & üJ(tlP...,tn)=u )) & (v) ( T 
(concat(u,*=',v)) — » ( T(s) f—> T(concat(tx,...,ti_-
v , ti+i» • ••*«.))))))• 
The variables are to be construed as having the same ran-
ges of values as above (p. 3°)• Hence, for any singular 
term u, for any sentence s, u is partially replaceable 
salva verlfoifre in s if, and only if, u occurs in s and for 
any co-referential singular term v, the sentence which 
results from replacing u with v will have the same truth 
value as s. I will henceforth refer to this formulation 
as PS-3. 
The difference between PS-2 and PS-3 is of consider-
able importance. According to PS-2, a certain singular 
term, say, 'Tully', given its occurrence in a sentence s, 
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is partially replaceable salva veritate in s if, and only 
if, any singular terra having the same reference as 'Tully' 
may replace 'Tully' in any sentence in which 'Tully* oc-
curs, salva. veritatei whereas according to PS-3, given 
that 'Tully' occurs in a sentence s, 'Tully' is partially 
replaceable salva veritate in s if, and only if, any sin-
gular term having the same reference as 'Tully' may re-
place 'Tully' in that sentence, salva veritate. This dif-
ference is effected by eliminating. 
' ( ^ „ . ( y i s ' l (( s'^concatt^ t R) & 
(3i) ( i*n & u n(t l f...,t n)=u ))• 
from the right side of the principal bi-conditional of 
PS-2 and replacing 's'' at its remaining occurrence with 
It should be clear that PS-3 escapes Linsky's cri-
ticism that PS is such that no two terms obey it. For 
consider the sentence 'Nixon was a president of the United 
States' as uttered, say, by an historian in the course of 
a lecture on American history. Any singular term having 
the same reference as 'Nixon' may replace 'Nixon' in this 
sentence salva veritate. 
It should be equally clear that PS-3 is immune to 
the sort of counter-example employed by Linsky in his 
first argument, and that, therefore, PS-3 escapes Linsky*s 
first criticism as well. 
What remains to be considered is whether PS-3 pro-
vides an adequate analysis of PS. PS-3 provides an ade-
quate analysis of PS just in case PS-3 provides an ade-
quate analysis of *R', for the whole point of PS is Just 
to provide an analysis of 'R'. Necessary and sufficient 
conditions of adequacy of an analysis of 'R' are (a) that 
'R' be analyzed so as to be true of some singular term-
sentence pairs and (b) that the suggested analysis incor-
porate the essential features of partial replaceability 
salva veritate of co-referential singular terms in sen-
tences. 
Where u is a singular term, the essential features 
of u's being partially replaceable salva veritate in a 
sentence a are (i) that u occurs in 8 and (il) that any 
sentence which results from replacing u with a co-
referential singular term has the same truth value as s. 
PS-3 does provide an adequate analysis of 'R'. That 
clause (i) is satisfied is accounted for by the require-
ment that 
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Ot-j^).. .(3tn) ( 8=concat(t l f... ,t n) & (ai) ( i<*n & 
\J^{\ t n)=u )). 
That clause (ii) is satisfied is accounted for by the re-
quirement that 
(v) ( T(concat(u,, = ,,v)) — > ( T(s) *-» (t(concat 
(t x v , ti+l»•••»* n))))• 
Hence, clause (b) is satisfied* As indicated above, clause 
(a) is satisfied as well. 
It follows that PS-3 provides an adequate analysis 
of 'R'. And Bince the point of PS is to provide an analy-
sis of 'R*, it follows that PS-3 provides an adequate an-
alysis of PS. 
University of Kansas 
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